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STATEMENT OF ISSUES: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in applying the 
doctrine of joint and several liability to 
appellant. 
2. Whether the Court's refusal to give certain jury 
instructions which attempted to apply the primary 
doctrine of assumption of risk to this case which 
involved a sporting activity was reversible error. 
3. Whether the court's refusal to give an instruction 
offered by the defendant concerning the specific 
duty of care of a proprietor to guard against inten-
tional assaults was reversible error. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: 
The following statutes bear upon a determination of the 
resolution of this action: 
A. Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 209 (old version), 
§ 78-27-37, et seq., U.C.A., 1953 
(repealed 1986) 
B. Laws of Utah 1986, Chapter 199 (new version), 
§ 78-27-37, et seq., U.C.A., 1953 
Please note that the complete text of the statutes 
appear in the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE; 
This is a tort action by a patron of a public roller 
skating rink against the operator of the rink and another, 
unidentified patron, for personal injury incurred. The action 
was filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County on 
January 25, 1985. It came to trial on July 28 and 29, 1986, 
before a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, as explained more fully below, and final judgment was 
entered on August 12, 1986. Defendant made payment of the judg-
ment pursuant to a Writ of Execution served August 15, 1986, and 
entered his Notice of Appeal on August 18, 1986. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
On November 8, 1984, plaintiff went to the Classic 
Skating Center in Orem, Utah, to roller skate with a friend and 
the children of her friend. (Trans., p. 28-29.) 
The Classic Skating Center is located in Orem, Utah, 
and is a large commercial facility with a skating floor approxi-
mately 851 x 1501. (Trans., pp. 75-76.) 
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Plaintiff's friend, Mrs. Inglis, entered upon the 
skating floor prior to the plaintiff and saw a teenage boy, never 
identified, knock down another woman. (Trans., pp. 6-7.) 
The plaintiff then went onto the roller skating floor 
and was trailing 10 feet behind Mrs. Inglis. (Trans., p. 18.) 
Mrs. Inglish testified that this same boy pushed the plaintiff 
down. (Trans., p. 4.) Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Inglis 
admitted she did not actually see the boy make contact with the 
plaintiff. (Trans., p. 24.) However, Mrs. Inglis heard the boy 
yell something to the effect that "I got another one" after 
making contact with the plaintiff. (Trans., p. 5.) The plain-
tiff never did see the John Doe that struck her. (Trans., p. 51-
52.) As a result of the fall, Mrs. Stephens suffered injury to 
her left wrist. (Trans., pp. 39-45.) 
There was some discrepancy in the testimony about the 
number of people present when the incident occurred. Mrs. Inglis 
testified there were approximately 50 people on the floor and 100 
people present in the facility. (Trans., pp. 16-17.) Plaintiff 
testified there were a "few hundred". (Trans., p. 48.) The 
manager testified that there were 400 patrons present that 
night. (Trans., p. 87.) 
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Several jury instructions offered by Henderson and 
described more specifically in this Brief and set forth in the 
Addendum, were rejected by the Court. Defendant specifically 
stated its exceptions to the rejection of the requested instruc-
tions at issue in this appeal. (Trans., pp. 111, 112.) 
The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff in the amount of $17,357.92 and allocated 75% negli-
gence to the unidentified defendant, John Doe, 25% negligence to 
the defendant Henderson, and no negligence to the plaintiff. 
(R., p. 283.) 
The verdict was reduced to judgment on August 12, 1986, 
over the objection of Henderson. (R., pp. 292, 307-308.) A Writ 
of Execution was issued August 13, 1986. (R., p. 340.) The Writ 
of Execution was served by a constable on Friday, August 15, 
1986, at 9:30 p.m. (R. , p. 344.) In lieu of having property 
seized, the defendant, Mr. Henderson, gave a personal check for 
the amount of the judgment, plus costs of service, which was 
replaced later by an insurance company check. (R., p. 345.) 
Consequently, defendant Henderson has paid 100% of the judgment, 
plus costs totaling $18,182.87, while having only been allocated 
25% of the liability. (R., pp. 349-351.) 
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claims that in a sporting activity case the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk remains at issue even though the doctrine has been 
merged into the comparative negligence statute. Otherwise, the 
effect would be to overrule the long-existing rule of sporting 
cases that assumption of risk is always a defense. Second, 
appellant claims that the failure of the District Court to give a 
specific instruction on duty of care was reversible error. 
Specifically, the only evidence presented by the plaintiff showed 
that the plaintiff was a victim of an intentional assault. The 
Court gave no instruction on the duty of care, but gave a general 
instruction on negligence. Consequently, the jury had no defini-
tive guideline to measure whether the duty of care had been 
breached. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT 
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY TO APPELLANT 
A. The Liability Reform Act. 
1. Introduction: 
At the close of plaintiff's case at trial, Henderson 
made a motion for the court to rule that the doctrine of joint 
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and several liability did not apply to this case by virtue of the 
provisions of the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (The Act), Laws of 
Utah 1986, Chapter 199, which eliminated the legal doctrine of 
joint and several liability in Utah, (Trans., p. 66). The Court 
denied the Motion, finding that the Act did not apply to pending 
cases. (Trans., p. 67.) 
The Liability Reform Act took effect on April 28, 1986, 
three months before the trial of this action. The Act repealed 
and re-enacted, among others, Sections 78-27-38 and 78-27-40, 
U.C.A., 1953. Those sections as re-enacted read as follows: 
"The fault of a person seeking recovery 
shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person. He may recover from any defendant 
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds 
his own. However, no defendant is liable 
to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributable to that defendant. 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable 
to any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant. . . 
ii 
In denying defendant's motion, the lower court stated 
that the Act effected a substantive change in law and "should not 
be enforced retroactively". (Trans., p. 67). The court's ruling 
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is erroneous for two reasons. First, the Court could have ap-
plied the Act prospectively, and, second, the Act effected a 
procedural and not substantive change in law, 
2. Retroactive vs. Prospective Application: 
The district court apparently determined that in order 
to apply the Act at all to this case, the court must apply it 
retroactively. Such a conclusion is incorrect since at the time 
the Act took effect, no right had vested in plaintiff which would 
have required retroactive application of the Act to defeat. 
Plaintiff's right to collect pursuant to the doctrine 
of joint and several liability obviously does not vest until 
judgment is rendered. Joint and several liability is merely a 
doctrine which enables a plaintiff who has recovered judgment to 
collect 100% of the judgment from any one of the multiple tort-
feasors even though each individual tort-feasor's percentage of 
negligence is less than 100%. Prior to judgment, the plaintiff 
does not have any right to collect anything from a defendant. 
The doctrine of joint and several liability does not give plain-
tiff any additional substantive theory by which a judgment may be 
recovered. At best, plaintiff acquired, at the time the cause of 
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action accrued, the expectation that if she were awarded a judg-
ment, the doctrine of joint and several liability would allow her 
to collect 100% of that judgment from any one of the multiple 
tort-feasors. Such an expectation is not a vested right. As the 
Court stated in Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954): 
". . . It is often said that a right is 
not 'vested1 unless it is something more 
than such a mere expectation as may be 
based upon an anticipated continuation of 
the present laws." At p. 692. 
Plaintiff had only an expectation with respect to the 
doctrine of joint and several liability at the time the Act took 
effect. The Act, prospectively applied, eliminated joint and 
several liability in all cases where the right to collect had not 
vested. Accordingly in this case, prospective application of the 
Act defeats plaintifffs expectation to collect her judgment 
jointly and severally against Henderson. 
The case of Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 
1979) addressed an issue similar to that involved in the present 
action. Campbell involved an action by a plaintiff to recover 
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident occurring on 
September 9, 1973. Plaintifffs complaint was filed February 25, 
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1974. On May 13, 1975 — after the complaint was filed but 
before the trial in October, 1977 — a statute went into effect 
which allowed the calculation of interest on special damages from 
the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of 
action. In the judgment in favor of plaintiff, the lower court 
allowed interest on plaintiff's special damages pursuant to the 
statute. The defendant appealed, arguing that such was an imper-
missible retroactive application of the statute. 
In addressing defendant's argument, the Court first 
referred to the general rule that legislative enactments operate 
prospectively rather than retroactively unless expressly declared 
otherwise. The Court then made a distinction between an enact-
ment making substantive changes and one making procedural changes 
and stated that the general rule against retroactive application 
did not apply to an enactment making a procedural change not 
affecting substantive rights. The Court stated as follows: 
"However, we see no need to resort to the 
application of distinguishing labels 
[i.e., procedural vs. substantive] in 
construing [the statute]. We do not view 
the statute as operating retroactively. 
The statute simply directs the court to 
add interest to the amount of damages 
found by the jury or the court. The 
statute is prospective in effect, since it 
applies to judgments rendered after the 
effective date of the act; it does not 
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clearly express any retroactive effect to 
judgments entered before its effective 
date, and therefore has no such effect. 
The fact that the time from which interest 
should be calculated predates the effec-
tive date of the statute does not cause 
the statute itself to operate retroactive-
ly. Plaintiff's right to interest in this 
case was dependent upon the law in effect 
at the time the judgment was entered. . . 
." At 1042 (Emphasis in original). 
Just as plaintifffs right to interest in Campbell was 
dependent upon the law in effect at the time the judgment was 
entered, application of the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity is dependent upon the law in effect at the time the judgment 
is entered and not at the time the cause of action accrued. The 
law in effect at the time judgment was entered in this case 
contained a provision eliminating the doctrine of joint and 
several liability. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it 
applied the doctrine of joint and several liability to this case. 
2. Substantive vs. Procedural Issues: 
The second reason the lower court's ruling was erron-
eous is that the Act effected not a substantive but a procedural 
change. Therefore, application of the Act is proper even should 
the Court view its application as retroactive. While the general 
rule provides that legislation may not be applied retroactively 
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in the absence of an express legislative declaration to that 
effect, an exception to that rule applies when the legislation 
changes only procedural rather than substantive law. This prin-
ciple was stated by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
"Plaintiff argues that retrospective 
operation of statutes is not favored by 
the courts. To be sure, this is the rule 
when retrospective enforcement would 
modify vested rignts or interests. 
A contrary rule applies, however, where a 
statute changes only procedural law by 
providing a different mode or form of 
procedure for enforcing substantive 
rights. Such remedial statutes are gener-
ally applied retrospectively to accrued or 
pending actions to further the legisla-
ture's remedial purpose." Pilcher v. 
State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983) 
See also State Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 
1000 (Utah 1982), which held that " [p]rocedural statutes enacted 
subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only 
to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as 
well." 
The distinction between substantive and procedural law 
has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
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"Substantive law is defined as the posi-
tive law which creates, defines and regu-
lates the rights and duties of the parties 
and which may give rise to a cause for 
action, as distinguished from adjective 
law which pertains to and prescribes the 
practice and procedure or the legal 
machinery by which the substantive law is 
determined or made effective." Petty v. 
Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589, 593-594 
(1948). 
In Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 
1985) the Iowa Supreme Court considered a newly enacted Iowa 
statute which eliminated joint and several liability and pre-
sented the same question of application to pending cases as 
here. In Baldwin the court ruled that the new statute made a 
procedural change only and should, therefore, be given retro-
active application. The court stated as follows: 
"It is well established that a statute is 
presumed to be prospective only unless 
expressly made retrospective. Statutes 
which specifically affect substantive 
rights are construed to operate prospec-
tively unless legislative intent to the 
contrary clearly appears from the express 
language or by necessary and unavoidable 
implication. Conversely, if the statute 
relates solely to a remedy or procedure, 
it is ordinarily applied both prospec-
tively and retrospectively. 
We have previously discussed the distinc-
tions between substantive and procedural 
law. Substantive law creates, defines and 
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regulates rights. Procedural law, on the 
other hand, 'is the practice, method, 
procedure, or legal machinery by which the 
substantive law is enforced or made effec-
tive. f 
Plaintiff had no vested right in a par-
ticular result of this litigation or in 
the continuation of the principle of 
unlimited joint and several liability. . . 
Any interest that these defendants 
might have in the continued state of the 
law concerning joint and several liability 
was not a 'vested1 right entitled to 
constitutional protection." At pp. 491 
and 492. 
Similarly, the Liability Reform Act made a procedural 
and not a substantive change in the law and should be given 
retroactive application. Assuming the Court does not reverse the 
judgment entirely on other grounds, this Court should order that 
the judgment be properly entered in the amount of 25% of the 
total judgment and that the excess paid be refunded, with inter-
B. Common Law Doctrine and Public Policy: 
In the District Court, Henderson requested the court to 
hold that "should the jury determine that the defendant is 
liable, the doctrine of joint and several liability ought not to 
be applied." (R. , p. 60.) The trial court's denial of 
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Henderson's request resulted in plaintiff collecting 100% of her 
judgment from Henderson when Henderson was found to be only 25% 
at fault. (R., p. 345.) The court's application of the doctrine 
of joint and several liability was contrary to the public policy 
and legal doctrine in Utah at the time of judgment. 
The doctrine of joint and several liability, which was 
abolished by the legislature in the Liability Reform Actf is not 
a statutory but a court-created, common-law doctrine. See gener-
ally, Groot v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 34 Utah 152, 96 P. 1019 
(1908). Prior to the enactment of the Liability Reform Act, the 
only Utah statute which directly related to the doctrine was § 
78-27-41(1), U.C.A. (1953), which stated as follows: 
"Nothing in [the Comparative Negligence] 
Act shall affect: 
(1) The common-law liability of the 
several joint tort-feasors to have judg-
ment recovered, and payment made, from 
them individually by the injured person 
for the whole injury. . . . " (Emphasis 
added) 
This statutory provision did not create the doctrine of joint and 
several liability; it merely acknowledged it and stated that the 
Comparative Negligence Act was not intended to affect the doc-
trine as it existed at common law. 
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As a court-made, common-law doctrine, joint and several 
liability is, as are all rules of the common law, subject to 
modification or abrogation by judicial decision. As stated by 
the Court of Appeals of Washington: 
"It is generally recognized that when a 
rule of law has had its origins in the 
common law and is therefore a creation of 
the courts, the courts may change or 
modify such rule." Irwin v. Coluccio, 648 
P.2d 458, 459 (Wash.App. 1582) . 
Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has stated: 
"Just as the common law is court-made law 
based upon the circumstances and condi-
tions of the time, so can the common law 
be changed by the court when conditions 
and circumstances change. When the reason 
for a rule no longer exists, the rule 
itself may be changed by the court." 
Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 880 
(Ariz. 1982) 
The common-law doctrine of joint and several liability 
apparently had its origins in cases where multiple defendants 
acted in concert to cause plaintiff's injuries. 
"[W]here the defendants acted in concert, 
!the act of one was the act of all,1 and 
each was therefore liable for the entire 
loss sustained by the plaintiff, even 
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though he might have caused only a part of 
it. The rule grew out of the common law 
concept of the unity of the cause of 
action; the jury could not be permitted to 
apportion the damages, since there was but 
one wrong. . . . 
But the common law developed likewise a 
distinct and altogether unrelated prin-
ciple: a defendant might be liable for 
the entire loss sustained by the plain-
tiff, even though his negligence concurred 
or combined with that of another to pro-
duce the result. . . . Apparently liabil-
ity was based upon an instinctive feeling 
that defendant was morally responsible for 
the result, and the evident impossibility 
of dividing the damages." Prosser, 
William L. , Joint Torts and Several Lia-
bility, 25 Cal. L.Rev. 413, 418 and 419 
(1936). 
Apparently, part of the justification for the doctrine of joint 
and several liability was that it acted as a counterbalance to 
the harsh common-law doctrine of contributory negligence which 
provided that a plaintiff must be totally without negligence to 
recover. See Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978). 
Whatever legal justification existed at common law for 
the doctrine of joint and several liability, it is clear that 
retention of the doctrine is no longer justified. The absolute 
bar of contributory negligence is gone from Utah, eliminating the 
justification of joint and several liability. The time has come 
for the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability to be 
judicially abolished. 
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Judicial abolition of joint and several liability is 
supported by court decisions in other states. In the case of 
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 
(N.M.App. 1982) the New Mexico Court addressed the issue whether 
joint and several liability ought to be retained in a pure com-
parative negligence system. While Utah does not have a pure 
comparative negligence system, the rationale of the New Mexico 
Court has equal validity in this action. The Court stated as 
follows: 
"The retention of joint and several lia-
bility ultimately rests on two grounds; 
neither ground is defensible. 
The first ground is the concept that a 
plaintiff's injury is 'indivisible1. . . . 
Prosser . . . states that the rule holding 
a concurrent tort-feasor for the entire 
loss 'grew out of the common-law concept 
of the unity of the cause of action; the 
jury could not be permitted to apportion 
the damages, since there was but one 
wrong.' The 'unity' concept, in turn was 
based on common law rules of pleading and 
joinder. . . . [T]he cases which retained 
joint and several liability under relaxed 
American rules of joinder and in cases 
where causes of injury are concurrent, 
rather than concerted: 
'seem to consider the question, not 
from the standpoint of whether it 
is just and reasonable to hold a 
person liable for all the damages 
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occasioned by a joint tort in which 
his individual part may have re-
sulted in little or no damage, but 
rather from the viewpoint of the 
unity of a cause in the old tech-
nical common-law sense. That as 
the tort-feasors committed the tort 
together, and a single writ was 
brought against them, and they were 
sued in a single action and found 
guilty, then the damages should be 
rendered in a single sum. For, as 
the action was a unit and all found 
guilty of the same wrong, they must 
be equally guilty of the same 
amount of wrong. . . . But with 
the broadening in modern times of 
the legal conceptions regarding 
real consistency in the law as 
distinguished from mere technical-
ity, the reasoning which appeared 
so persuasive to the old English 
jurists has lost much, if not all, 
of its force.! 
Joint and several liability is not to be 
retained in our pure comparative negli-
gence system on a theory of one indivis-
ible wrong. The concept of one indivis-
ible wrong, based on common-law technical-
ities is obsolete, and is not to be ap-
plied in comparative negligence cases in 
New Mexico. . . . 
The second ground is that joint and sever-
al liability must be retained in order to 
favor plaintiffs; a plaintiff should not 
bear the risk of being unable to collect 
his judgment. We fail to understand the 
argument. Between one plaintiff and one 
defendant, the plaintiff bears the risk of 
the defendant being, insolvent; on what 
basis does the risk shift if there are two 
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defendants, and one is insolvent?" At pp. 
584, 585. 
Similarly, in Brown v. Keill, supra, the Kansas Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
"There is nothinq inherently fair about a 
defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100% 
of the loss, and there is no social policy 
that should compel defendants to pay more 
than their fair share of the loss. Plain-
tiffs now take the parties as they find 
them. If one of the parties at fault 
happens to be a spouse or a governmental 
agency, and if by reason of some competing 
social policy the plaintiff cannot receive 
payment for his injuries from the spouse 
or agency, there is no compelling social 
policy which requires the co-defendant to 
pay more than his fair share of the 
loss. The same is true if one of the 
defendants is wealthy and the other is 
not. Previously, when the plaintiff had 
to be totally without negligence to re-
cover and the defendants had to be merely 
negligent to incur an obligation to pay, 
an argument could be made which justified 
putting the burden of seeking contribution 
on the defendants. Such an argument is no 
longer compelling because of the purpose 
and intent behind the adoption of the 
comparative negligence statute." At p. 
874. 
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These comments of the New Mexico and Kansas courts take 
on even greater significance when considered in light of the 
recent legislative abolition of the doctrine of joint and several 
liability in the Liability Reform Act. The Utah Legislature has 
clearly declared that the policy of this state is not to hold 
defendant joint tort-feasors jointly and severally liable. If 
the Court does not reverse the entire judgment on other groundsf 
this Court should rule consistent with that policy and judicially 
abolish the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability 
without regard to whether the Liability Reform Act is retro-
active, prospective, substantive or procedural. This Court 
should reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter 
judgment in favor of plaintiff only to the extent of 25% of her 
damages as found by the trier of factf and should order that the 
excess paid by defendant be refunded with interest. 
POINT II 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO 
INSTRUCT ON ASSUMPTION OF 
RISK WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
A. Basic Concepts. 
Roller skating has been traditionally considered an 
athletic or sporting activity. Hatley v. Skateland, Inc., 619 
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P.2d 1333 (Or.App. 1980). The law has long been that those who 
participate in sporting activities or as spectators assume the 
risk of injury usually associated with such activity. Hamilton 
v_. Salt Lake City Corp., 120 Utah 647, 237 P.2d 841 (1951); 
Hatley, supra; Brody v. Westmoor Beach and Blade Club, Inc., 5 24 
P.2d 1087 (Colo.App. 1974). 
Prior to the adoption of the Comparative Negligence 
Act, Section 78-27-37 (Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 209, Section 
1), assumption of risk acted as an absolute bar to recovery by a 
plaintiff. However, the term "assumption of risk" was a label 
which actually applied to several concepts. See 57 Am.Jur.2d, 
Negligence, Section 276-279 (1971). The Utah Courts recognized 
that assumption of risk may overlap with contributory negligence 
conceptually but may also stand alone under certain circum-
stances. Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 
(1959). These different concepts were often referred to as 
primary and secondary assumption of risk. Jacobsen Construction 
Company v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980) ; 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563 P. 2d 1247 
(Utah 1977) . 
In Jacobsen Construction, supra, this Court held that 
the comparative negligence statute included the concept of as-
sumption of risk and stated that assumption risk terminology is 
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to be avoided. This Court explained the difference between 
primary and secondary assumption of risk as follows: 
"In its primary sense, it is an alternative 
expression for the proposition that defen-
dant was not negligent, that is, there was 
no duty owed or there was no breach of an 
existing duty. In its secondary sense, 
assumption of risk is an affirmative defense 
to an established breach of duty and as such 
is a phase of contributory negligence." At 
310. 
Jacobsen Construction then correctly concluded and 
held: 
"We thus hold that under our comparative 
negligence statute 'assumption of risk1 
language is not appropriate to describe the 
various concepts previously dealt with under 
that terminology but is to be treated, in 
its secondary sense, as contributory negli-
gence." At 312 (Emphasis added) 
B. Analysis. 
In this case, the trial court refused to give the 
defendant's requested instructions numbered 1, 3, 21, and 26. 
(R., pp. 210, 212, 231 and 237.) See Addendum for complete 
text. The thrust of these instructions was that the jury could 
consider the degree of assumption of risk by the plaintiff in 
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participating in a sporting activity and convert that assumption 
of risk to a comparative negligence determination. As explained 
below, the Court erred in rejecting those instructions to the 
prejudice of the defendant because instructions numbers 8 and 34, 
as given, required the jury to find that the decision to roller 
skate was a negligent act in order to attribute any comparative 
negligence to the plaintiff. A result no jury is likely to ever 
find. 
Jacobsen Construction, at 310 to 311, appears to reject 
the distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk 
and direct the courts of this state to cease from using that 
term. All assumption of risk is merged into the concept of 
comparative negligence. 
Unfortunately, the dicta of Jacobsen Construction is 
overbroad when applied to a sporting activity case. If an injury 
results from a risk normally associated with the sport, the 
comparative negligence analysis does not work because a juror 
would have to assign some percentage of negligence to the plain-
tiff for the mere decision to participate. The effect of 
strictly applying Jacobsen Construction is to overrule the long 
time rule of assumption of risk in sporting cases. 
-24-
In a skating case strikingly similar to this one, 
assumption of risk barred the plaintiff with a comparative neg-
ligence statute. In Ridge v. Kladnick, 713 P.2d 1131 (Wash.App. 
1986), the Court held that a roller skater could not recover as a 
matter of law where the injury was shown to have arisen out of 
the usual risk associated with a sporting activity. This Court 
could choose to apply that rule to this case. The error made by 
the trial court was rejection of any instruction addressing 
assumption of risk and ignoring the entire sporting activity 
doctrine well established in the law. 
The error committed can be demonstrated by the use of 
two hypotheticals. A driver that sees an oncoming train at a 
crossing and makes a conscious choice to try and beat the train 
through the crossing is voluntarily assuming a risk which is 
unreasonable and ought to be judged according to the comparative 
negligence principles stated in Jacobsen Construction. A person 
who chooses to play football, however, does not make an unreason-
able decision to which comparative negligence may be attached. 
Rather, that person is assuming known reasonable risks associated 
with participation in football. A fact finder, under those 
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circumstances, should be asked to determine not whether an in-
jured football player was negligent, but whether the injury arose 
out of the normal risks associated with the game which were 
willingly, but not unreasonably, assumed. 
In Swagger v. City of Crystal, 379 N.W.2d 183 
(Minn.App. 1985), the Court considered the question of assumption 
of risk by a spectator injured at a Softball game in the context 
of a comparative negligence statute. There, a jury awarded 
damages against the city that operated the softball park. The 
trial court granted the City's Motion for Judgment notwithstand-
ing the Verdict. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that pri-
mary assumption of risk survives the enactment of a comparative 
negligence statute because, in its primary sense, assumption of 
risk is not really a negligence concept. Rather, it is a deter-
mination that the defendant owed no duty of care originally to 
the plaintiff. 
The defendant presented at trial evidence that contact 
with other skaters was a normal incident of roller skating and 
that the plaintiff had experience at roller skating. (Trans., 
pp. 47-48, 84, 105-106.) See Ridge, supra. 
This Court could retain the concept of primary assump-
tion of risk as an absolute bar under the Comparative Negligence 
Statute and rule, as did the Ridge case, that the plaintiff is 
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barred. However, the thrust of the rejected instructions, which 
were drafted in light of Jacobsen Construction, is to retain the 
concept of primary assumption of risk as a comparative fault 
consideration for the jury by converting usual risks to a compar-
ative percentage of fault. Otherwise, unless this Court retains 
primary assumption of risk for sporting cases, no jury will ever, 
in a sporting case, find comparative fault on the part of the 
plaintiff because that requires a social conclusion that partici-
pating in sports is inherently unreasonable. 
Because the jury was required to find that the decision 
to roller skate by the plaintiff was inherently negligent and 
because no jury is likely ever to do that, the defendant was 
deprived of the opportunity to have the comparative fault proper-
ly assessed. If the instructions requested had been given, the 
jury could have quantified to what extent the plaintiff assumed 
the risk of the type of injury which was incurred willingly as 
incidental to roller skating. It is not unreasonable to assume 
that the plaintiff could have been assessed at least 50% fault as 
that was the conclusion under similar circumstances as a matter 
of law by the court in Hatley v. Skateland, Inc., and in Ridge v. 
Kladnick, supra. 
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In summary, the Court is requested to reverse the 
judgment based upon the deprivation of the defendant's ability to 
have comparative fault considered. The Court is further request-
ed to clarify how the trial court is to handle primary assumption 
of risk in a sporting case under the Comparative Negligence 
Statute. That is, determine whether primary assumption of risk 
is an absolute bar to liability as with Ridge, or whether it 
should have been considered as comparative negligence. 
Some consideration should be given to the Court's 
determination of the first point of appeal, namely whether the 
Liability Reform Act applies to this case. Appellant proposes to 
the Court that if the Liability Reform Act does apply to this 
case, that the error suggested is even more clear. New Section 
78-27-37 talks in terms of "fault" rather than "negligence". 
Accordingly, if the new Act applies, the concept of primary 
assumption of risk is more easily considered under a fault con-
cept rather than a negligence concept. Rejected Instructions 
Nos. 1 and 26 would have been particularly useful to a jury in 
applying a comparative fault concept rather than a comparative 
negligence concept because, under these circumstances, the term 
"fault" is broad enough to include primary assumption of risk. 
See, Comment, "Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence 
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System - Doctrinal, Practical and Policy Issues", 39 Ohio St. 
L.J. 364 (1978). 
POINT III 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO 
INSTRUCT ON THE APPROPRIATE DUTY 
OF CARE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The evidence presented by the plaintiff was that of an 
intentional assault on the part of the John Doe skater. A friend 
of the plaintiff, who witnessed the incident, testified that the 
plaintiff was deliberately pushed from behind by John Doe. 
(Trans., p. 4.) She further testified that John Doe, after 
knocking down the plaintiff, yelled something to the effect of 
"I scored another". (Trans., pp. 5 and 25.) This witness testi-
fied that she had seen John Doe knock down another woman moments 
before making contact with the plaintiff. (Trans., p. 6.) 
The plaintiff testified that she did not see John Doe 
before the incident nor does she know exactly what he did to 
injure her. (Trans., pp. 51-52.) 
In short, the evidence presented by the plaintiff as to 
how she was injured established that she was the victim of an 
intentional tort. That is, John Doe had deliberately knocked her 
down and caused her injury. Consequently, at trial, appellant 
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took the position that the standard of care which applied to the 
case was that of guarding against intentional torts* (Trans., 
pp. 67 - 68.) Consistent with that argument, appellant offered 
defendant's Instruction No. 27, which stated the duty of care of 
a proprietor of an amusement facility to guard one patron against 
assaults of other patrons. The Court rejected the proffered 
instruction and gave general instructions on negligence which 
appellant claims were insufficient. (R. , p. 238; trans., p. 
1 12.) 
The law is well settled that the purpose of jury in-
structions is to fully inform the jury as to the applicable law 
in order to enable the jury to fully and fairly resolve the 
dispute. Slkington v. Foustf 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980). An ex-
amination of the instructions actually given by the Court shows 
that no instruction was given on the duty of care which the jury 
was to have considered in determining whether the defendant had 
been negligent. Specifically, Instruction No. 8 is the only 
instruction which seems to describe negligence to the jury. (R., 
p. 251.) See Addendum. This instruction is only a broad state-
ment of the law of negligence. 
The rejection of a specific instruction on duty of care 
and the giving of a general instruction on negligence is pre-
judicial error because it leaves the jury to speculate as to what 
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standard the defendant has violated in order to find liability in 
the defendant. 
A similar issue was analyzed in Pearce v. Motel 6, 
Inc. , 624 P.2d 215 (Wash. App. 1981). There, the plaintiff 
brought an action for a fall in a motel bathroom. The trial 
court rejected a specific instruction requested by the defendant 
concerning the duty of care of a motel owner towards patrons. 
Instead, the Court gave a general statement of the law of negli-
gence to the jury. The appellate court held that a defendant is 
entitled to an instruction which fully advises the jury of the 
exact duty of care which must be found to have been breached in 
order to fix liability. Otherwise, a general charge of negli-
gence has the effect of converting the defendant into a mere 
insurer because the jury has no real standard by which it can 
judge breach of the duty of care. 
The general charge of negligence as given as a result 
of rejecting the plaintiff's specific duty of care instruction 
was clearly substantial error in this case. An intentional act 
by a patron against another in Utah falls within a specific duty 
of care which is different from the general duty associated with 
negligence. In particular, the instruction offered was based 
upon Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982). Gustaveson 
held that a duty of care of a bowling alley operator to guard 
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against assaults by one patron against another did not extend to 
making the proorietor an insurer of the safety of patrons. 
Gustaveson explained that a proprietor must have some cause to 
believe that the particular individual committing the tort would 
so act. There, as here, the tortfeasor gave no warning of a 
problem until moments before he struck. 
Gustaveson was not a new development in Utah law. In 
Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977), this Court considered the 
duty of care of a lodge operator to protect a business visitor on 
the premises against a shooting by another business visitor. 
This Court stated that the proprietor needed to have notice of 
the propensity of a particular individual to assault or other 
evidence of a high likelihood of the willful tort occurring. 
The error of rejection of Instruction No. 27 is aggra-
vated by the giving of Instruction No. 19 without a duty of care 
instruction. Instruction No. 19, as given, advises the jury that 
the duty of care can vary according to circumstances, but no 
guidance is given to assist the jury in determining what duty 
exists under what circumstances. (R., p. 262.) As reflected by 
the two cases described immediately above, the duty of care of a 
proprietor is not always fixed and may be specific according to 
particular circumstances. For example, in Black v. Nelson, 532 
P.2d 212 (Utah 1975), the Court considered an injury to a patron 
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upon premises resulting from falling down some stairs. The Court 
considered the location of the stairs and the activity of the 
plaintiff at the time of the injury. This Court stated that the 
duty of care of a proprietor can vary according to the dangers 
reasonably anticipated. 
Rejected Instruction No. 27 would have fixed the ele-
ment of duty for the jury's application in light of the evidence 
of the case. Because the plaintiff presented no evidence as to 
the standard of care in comparable facilities and because the 
only evidence plaintiff presented was that of an intentional act 
on the part of John Doe, a general negligence charge as given by 
the Court left the jury without any meaningful guidelines to 
consider what duty of care had been breached. Certainly, the 
jury could not perceive that a proprietor of an amusement facil-
ity had the specific duty of care reflected in a line of cases 
culminating most recently in Gustaveson. 
The standard of care propounded by appellant at trial 
arising from the evidence that the act was intentional on the 
part of John Doe without reasonable warning sufficient to allow 
the appellant to prevent the injury was not fully before the jury 
for fair consideration. Timely objection was made. (Trans., pp. 
67-68, 112.) Consequently, the judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed as the record fails to show a breach of the 
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correct cuty of care or be remanded for a new trial upon express 
instructions of the elements of negligence and the specific duty 
of care of the proprietor/defendant in this action. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding argument establishes that the judgment of 
the District Court should be reversed for several reasons andf at 
a minimum, should be reversed in part to reflect that the defen-
dant is liable only for 25% of the judgment. 
The doctrine of joint and several liability was not 
applicable to this action because the Liability Reform Act could 
properly be applied prospectively to the action. At worst, the 
Act adopted a procedural change which did not affect a vested 
right and could be retroactively applied. Further, the common 
law doctrine of joint and several liability is contrary to public 
policy and this Court should abolish the doctrine without regard 
to the nature of the Liability Reform Act. 
Case law in effect at the time of trial suggested that 
any instruction on assumption of risk should be avoided. How-
ever, this sporting case appeared to not be anticipated by the 
direction of the case law. Accordingly, this Court could find, 
as a matter of law, that the doctrine of primary assumption of 
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risk acts as a complete bar to the plaintiff as her injury arose 
out of risk associated with the activity. If the rule of 
Jacobsen Construction is literally applied to primary assumption 
of riskf the Court still should have instructed the jury in 
accordance with the long established law concerning sporting 
cases. 
Finally, this Court could rule, as a matter of law, 
that the evidence presented does not show a violation of the 
correct duty of care of the defendant. At least, remand for a 
new trial is appropriate so that the jury may be properly in-
structed on the specific duty of care of the defendant. 
The Appellant respectfully requests the Court, for the 
reasons stated above, to rule as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff is barred by the doctrine of assumption of risk or by the 
failure to show any breach of the correct duty of care. In the 
alternative, the Court is requested to reverse the judgment and 
order a new trial or to order the return of 75% of the judgment 
to the Appellant as the amount in excess of the negligence found 
by the jury. Additionally, should the Court order a new trial, 
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the Appellant respectfully requests the Court clarify the proper 
application of the doctrine of joint and several liability to 
avoid additional appeal. 
DATED this 21st day of November, 1986. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
^ 
GREGORY £S^ANDERS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Brent Henderson, d/b/a 
Classic Skating Center 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH CQffiTX - " - ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN F. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, 
and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 68,622 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the 
questions submitted to us as follows: 
1. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
defendant Brent Henderson, d/b/a Classic Skating Center negligent? 
Yes X No 
2. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens1 injuries? 
Yes / \ No 
3. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
defendant John Doe nee igent? 
Yes S\ No 
4. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens' injuries? 
Yes f \ No 
5. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens negligent? 
Yes No / \ 
6. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
her injuries? 
Yes No /C 
7. Considering all the negligence which caused the 
accident at 100 percent, which percentage of that negligence is 
attributable: 
A. To Defendant Brent Henderson, yt j£ 
d/b/a Classic Staking Center mJU O % 
B. To Defendant John Doe / JJ % 
C. To Plaintiff Joan F. Stephens 0 % 
TOTAL 100 % 
8. What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Joan 
F. Stephens, for the damages, if any, which she sustained as a 
result of the accident? 
A. For special damages 
B. For general damages r m'y* * 
TOTAL $ J%3S7. 9* 
DATED AND SIGNED this 4CM day of July, 1986. 
ODJZ D-J34 
JAMES G. CLARK 
42 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 375-6092 
RAY HARDING IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
4 8 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 6 72 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-3000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN F. STEPHENS, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT ON 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
vs. : 
BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a : 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and 
JOHN DOE, : 
Defendants. : Civil No. 68,622 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before a jury in the court of the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
on the 28th and 29th of July, 1986. The plaintiff was represented 
by counsel James G. Clark and Ray Harding Ivie of IVIE & YOUNG. 
The defendant was represented by Gregory J. Sanders of KIPP AND 
CHRISTIAN. After hearing the evidence, the instructions of 
the Court, and the argument of counsel, the jury retired to 
consider their answers to a Special Verdict. The jury returned 
a Special Verdict as follows: 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the 
questions submitted to us as follows: 
1. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
defendant Brent Henderson, d/b/a Classic Skating Center negligent? 
Yes X No 
2. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens1 injuries? 
Yes X No 
3. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
defendant John Doe negligent? 
Yes X No 
4. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens1 injuries? 
Yes X No 
5. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
plaintiff Joan F. Stephens negligent? 
Yes No X 
6. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
her injuries? 
Yes No X 
7. Considering all the negligence which caused the 
accident at 100 percent, which percentage of that negligence is 
attributable: 
A. To Defendant Brent Henderson, 
d/b/a Classic Skating Center 25 % 
B. To Defendant John Doe 75 % 
C. To Plaintiff Joan F. Stephens 0 % 
TOTAL 100 
8. What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Joan 
F. Stephens, for the damages, if any, which she sustained as a 
result of the accident? 
A. For special damages $ 5 ,357 .92 
B. For general damages $ 12,000.00 
TOTAL $ 17,357.92 
DATED AND SIGNED this 29th day of July, 19 86. 
s/ 
FOREMAN 
Now, therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
That judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor of 
the plaintiff, Joan F. Stephens, and against the defendant 
Brent Henderson, d/b/a Classic Skating Center, for the sum of 
Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and 92/100 
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($17,357.92), together with interest on special damages of 
eight percent (8%) per annum from the date of the occurence of 
the act giving rise to the cause of action to the date of entry 
of judgment, for the sum of Seven Hundred and Forty-Four 
Dollars and 95/100 ($744.95), together with her costs of court 
to be taxed hereafter. Said judgment shall bear interest at 
the statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) from the date of 
judgment until paid. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /%<? day of d&^^C*.J / 
1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
CULLEN Y. O^RISTENSEN, Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Judgment on Special Verdict, with postage 
prepaid thereon this Xjjy day of July, 1986, to: 
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
6 00 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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JAMES G. CLARK £j. _ ' .\\' 
42 North University Ave., #1 T "~ 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Tele. (801) 375-6092 
Ray H. Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 No. University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN F. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERENT HENDERSON, d/b/a/ 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and 
JOHN DOE, 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
: Case No. 68,622 
: Judge: C. Y. CHRISTENSEN 
Defendants . 
TO THE SHERIFF OF UTAH COUNTY, OR TO ANY OTHER PEACE OFFICE 
WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
WHEREAS, Judgment was rendered by this court for Plaintiff 
and against defendants HENDERSON and CLASSIC in the above-
entitled action on August 12, 1986, in the amount of $18,102.87 
and said Judgment is not satisfied; 
THESE ARE THEREFORE, to command you to collect the aforesaid 
judgment together with the cost of this execution, and that you 
levy on and sell enough of the unexempted personal property, or 
if enough unexempted personal property cannot be found, then of 
the unexemnpted real property of the said defendants HENDERSON 
and CLASSIC to satisify the same with all legal costs accruing 
hereon, and this shall be your sufficient warrant for so doing, 
and within sixty days make due returns fore this writ with your 
doings in the premises hereon endorsed, WHEREOF PAIL NOT. 
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this 13th day 
of August, 1986. 
WILLIAM HUISH, CLERK 
nbi23l6 
/ 
Deputy Clerk 
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JAMES G. CLARK ' -*"-"'• ••..;• :.-
42 North University Ave., #1 *!~__ --• -
Provo, Utah 84601 
Tele. (801) 375-6092 
Ray Phillips Ivie 
Ray Harding Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 No. University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
JOAN P. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
BRENT HENDERSON, d/b/a/ 
CLASSIC SKATING CENTER, and 
JOHN DOE, 
P R A E C I P E 
Case No. 68,622 
Judge: C. Y. CHRISTENSEN 
Defendants . 
TO THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE OF UTAH COUNTY: 
By authority of the writ of execution issued in the above-
entitled action herewith delivered to you, directing you to 
satisfy the judgment in said action out of the property situate 
in Utah County, State of Utah, belonging to defendant Brent 
Henderson d/b/a/ Classic Skating Center, herein named, you are 
hereby requested and directed, as provided by statute in such 
cases, to levy upon and sell all the right, title, equity and 
interest of said defendant, in and to the following described 
property, to wit: 
1. The property and contents of Classic Skating 
Center at 250 So, State Street, Orem, Utah; including 
games, equipment, all rental skates and all cash in 
cash registers . 
You are directed to remove from the premises all 
skates and all money in the cash registers immediately. 
2. The real property and all unexempt personal 
property of Brent Henderson located at 1036 So. 300 
West, Orem, Utah. 
You are further requested and directed to proceed with sale 
of said property as provided by law, when you have taken 
possession or control thereof, and this shall be your sufficient 
warrant for so doing. 
Dated this 13th day of August, 1986. 
Jm fflU 
ZkWffi G. CLARK, Attorney for 
// Plaintiff Stephens 
nbi2317 
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LAWS OF UTAH 1973, CHAPTER 209 
(OLD VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.) 
78-27-37. Comparative negligence—Diminishment of damages—"Con-
tributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."—Contributory neg-
ligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal repre-
sentative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in 
death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great 
as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery 
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion 
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used 
in this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk." 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 1. 
78-27-38. Separate special verdicts on damages and percentage of negli-
gence—Reduction of damages.—The court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining 
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negli-
gence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount 
of the damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person seeking recovery. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 2. 
78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors—Discharge of common 
liability by joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled 
to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged 
the common liability or more than his prorata share thereof. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 3. 
LAWS OF UTAH 1973, CHAPTER 209 
(OLD VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.) 
cont. 
78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor—Determination of relative de-
grees of fault of joint tort-feasors—"Joint tort-feasor" defined.—(1) A 
joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person shall 
not be entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor whose 
liability to the injured person is not extinguished by that settlement. 
(2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint tort-feasors to 
an extent that it would render inequitable an equal distribution by contribu-
tion among them of their common liability, the relative degrees of fault of 
the joint tort-feasors shall be considered in determining their prorata 
shares, solely for the purpose of determining their rights of contribution 
among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person for 
the whole injury as at common law. 
(3) As used in this section, "joint tort-feasor" means one of two or 
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to 
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against 
all or some of them. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 4. 
78-27-41. Individual liability of joint tort-feasors, right of indemnity 
under law, and contractual right to contribution or indemnity not affected. 
—Nothing in this act shall affect : 
(1) The common-law liability of the several joint tort-feasors to have 
judgment recovered, and payment made, from them individually by the 
injured person for the whole injury. However, the recovery of a judgment 
by the injured person against one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the 
other joint tort-feasors. 
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist under present law. 
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity arising from contract or 
agreement. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 5. 
78-27-42. Release of joint tort-feasor—Reduction of injured person's 
claim.—A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether 
before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors, unless 
the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors 
by the greater of: (1) The amount of the consideration paid for that re-
lease; or (2) the amount or proportion by which the release provides that 
the total claim shall be reduced. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 6. 
78-27-43. Release of joint tort-feasor—Requirements for relief from 
liability to make contribution.—(1) A release by the injured person of 
one joint tort-feasor does not relieve him from liability to make contribution 
to another joint tort-feasor unless that release : 
(a) Is given before the right of the other'tort-feasor to secure a money 
judgment for contribution has accrued; and 
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the extent of the prorata share of the 
released tort-feasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all 
the other tort-feasors. 
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THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT 
LAWS OF UTAH 1986, CHAPTER 199 
(NEW VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.) 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: >
 { 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery,J 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omis-1 
sion proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sus-
tained by a person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to^ 
negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of 
risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a producv 
products liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. ^j 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it Is 
-*, 
authorized to act as legal representative. A 
.rl i 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 1. 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. J 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by 
that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants 
whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attrib : 
utable to that defendant. ! 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 2. 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on damages and pro-
portion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the 
jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount 
of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable 
to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 3. 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of 
fault — No contribution. 
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may 
be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of 
the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other 
person. 
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT 
LAWS OF UTAH 1986, CHAPTER 199 
(NEW VERSION §78-27-37 et seq.) 
cont. 
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litiga-
tion, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contrib-
uted to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of 
having determined their respective proportions of fault. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 5. 
78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge 
other defendants. 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants 
does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 6. 
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem-
nity, contribution. 
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common 
law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, 
governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclu-
sive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution 
arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 7. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and 
prudent person would have done under the circumstances, or 
doing what such person under such circumstances would not have 
done. The fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act. 
The person whose conduct we set up as a standard is 
not the extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the 
exceptionally skillful one, but a person of reasonable and 
ordinary prudence. While exceptional caution and skill are to 
be admired and encouraged, the law does not demand them as a 
general standard of conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
You are instructed that inasmuch as the amount of caution used by an 
ordinarily prudent person varies in direct proportion to a danger known to be 
involved in his undertaking, it follows that in the exercise of ordinary care the 
amount of caution required will vary in accordance with the nature of the act and 
the surrounding circumstances. To put it another way, the amount of caution 
involved in the exercise of ordinary care and hence required by law increases or 
decreases as does the danger that reasonably should be apprehended. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ / 
Contributory negligence will not bar recovery in an 
action by any person to recover damages for negligence 
resulting in injury to a person, if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person 
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall 
be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
A participant in a sports activity such as roller 
skating is deemed to accept the dangers involved to the extent 
such are or should be obvious. 
-C/ 
Brody v. Westmoor Beach and Blade Club, Inc., 624 P.2d 1087 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1974).) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
By engaging in roller skating at the defendants 
facility, the plaintiff assumed the risk of unwanted and 
potentially injurious accidental contacts with other skaters. 
! /I
 U " 
Hatley v. Skateland, Inc., 619 P.2d 1333 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
There is a legal principle, commonly referred to by 
the term "assumption of risk", which is as follows: 
One is said to assume a risk when he voluntarily 
manifests his assent to a dangerous condition or to the creation 
or maintenance of a dangerous condition and voluntarily exposes 
himself to that danger, or when he knows, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care would know, that a danger exists in the condition 
of the property and voluntarily places himself or remains within 
the position of danger. 
If you find that Joan Stephens assumed the risks which 
were known by her or which should have been known by her 
concerning the dangers associated with roller skating, she would 
be guilty of negligence. 
} 
i ° ' 
JIFU 17.1 (modified); Section 78-27-37, UCA 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q-'-L 
In determining whether the plaintiff was comparatively 
negligent, you may consider whether her injuries arose as a 
result of the usual risk associated with roller skating which 
the plaintiff could reasonably anticipate. 
i 
•0 1/ 
! 
Section 28-27-37, Utah Code Annotated,1953 
Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 0- ^ 
Should you determine that the plaintiff was deliberately 
knocked down, you are instructed that a roller skating proprietor 
has a duty to guard roller skaters against assaults by fellow 
roller skaters if the circumstances are such that an ordinarily 
prudent person might reasonably anticipate the danger of such 
assaults and knew or should have known of the tendancy of a 
fellow skater to assault other patrons of the establishment. 
Gustavesson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of November, 
1986, four true and correct copies (2 each) of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were mailed to: 
James G. Clark 
42 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Ray Harding Ivie 
Ray Phillips Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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